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Draft Recommendation
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The Assembly.
(i) Considering that srnce 1992 WEU's principal role has been to provide a capability for conduct-
ing the Petersberg missions rvith a vierv to managing crises rvhich may arise in Europe:
(i, Welcoming the major organisational efforts made by WEU in the field of crisis management
r.vith a vierv to:
- 
developing the structures that are necessary- for the preparation of Council decisions,
- 
fully dcveloping all the procedures required to manage relations behveen the numerous players
involved.
- 
managing the process of consultation rvith the relevant international organisations (EU.
NATO- OSCE, UN, Council of Europe etc);
(iii) Deeply perplexed therefore by the fact that the European Union has not called on WEU during
the current crisis in Kosovo, inter alia for elaborating and implementing plans in the humanitarian field
in FYROM and Albania:
(rv) Deploring in addition the considerable time required to organise relations betlveen WEU and the
EU in the event of a crisis and the diffrculties. particularlv of a financial nature, that are encountered;
(v) Considering that under the present WEU structure, in the event of a crisis:
the Military Staffis rcsponsible for elaborating strategic options:
the Militarl' Delegates Committee examines those options and advises the Council on them:
the Politico-Military,'Group is responsible for finalising the options and submitting them to the
Council:
(vt) Alvare of the need to harmonise political and military positions at the highest level before the
strategic options are submitted to the Council:
(vii) Au,are of the fact that there is no hierarchical link betrveen the Secretariat-General, Military
Staff and Satellite Centre, all of r,vhich are directly' anslverable to the Council,
(viii) Taking the vielv that the existence of a genuinely autonomous capabilit-v for elaborating strate-
gic options depends on the expertise ofthe Militaqy Statr;
(i9 Noting the shortcomings of WEU's intelligence policl'- despite the crucial importance of a good
intelligence policy for preparing relevant strategic options,
(x) Considering that the Situation Centre does not currently have the resources it needs to present
situation reports to the Council in the right conditions;
(xi) Considering that for the preparation and conduct of a WEU-led military operation, combined
headquarters on three separate levels are required:
the WEU Military Staff, responsible for preparing strategic options;
the "Operation Commander's" headquarters, located on a strategic level and responsible for
providing an interface betlveen the political authorities and the forces on the ground,
the "Force Commander's" headquarters, located on an operational level and deployed, under
normal circumstances, in the theatre of operations:
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(xii) Noting the lack of a permanent European headquarters on the second and third levels, notwith-
standing the organisation on a case-by-case basis of headquarters around a core provided b1, a
"framework nation'' or by a European multinational force headquarters:
(xiii) Noting that the system oforganising European headquarters on a case-by-case basis causes de-
lays and poses the political problem of choosing a "framework nation":
(xiv) Noting the fact that the headquarters of European multinational forces at the level of "Force
Commander other words, of the CJTF-t1pe suitable for projection 
- 
are not, in fact- combined
headquarters;
(xv) Noting, nevertheless, that while the ESDI rvhich is currentll,being developed within the Alliance
is very useful. it does not give the European Union a "capacity for autonomous action" (Saint Malo
Franco-British Declaration) under all circumstances;
(xvi) Noting that even after the Washington Summit- the ESDI within the Alliance means that the
United States can leave Europe to take action on the ground while retaining political control of crisis
management through the Norttr Atlantic Council;
(xvit) Emphasising the real difficulties involved in defining a European chain of command within
NATO;
(xviii) Noting that the negotiations betrveen NATO and WEU on making NATO assets and capabilities
available to WEU led to the adoption at the Washington Summit of no more than a very gencral frame-
work for an agreement which has to be renegotiated on a case-by-case basis:
(xix) Noting that WEU has a sufficient number of forces ansrverable to WEU (FAWEU) at its
disposal for conducting Petersberg missions. but that these multinational forces must better coordinate
their activities;
(xx) Emphasising the crucial importance of strengthening European capabilities and therefore lvel-
coming the initiative taken by the German Presidency to organise an audit of capabilities available in
WEU member countries for European military operations:
(mi) Noting the shortcomings of European forces rvith regard to high-technology equipment, particu-
larly in the field of long-range precision missiles:
(wiil Noting the long response times required to assemble European multinational forces on a case-
by-case basis,
RECOMMENDS THAT TT{E COI]NCIL
l. Seek, pending the decisions to be taken r,vith regard to the integration of WEU in the European
Union, to improve relations between the EU and WEU in the event of a crisis, particularly from the
financial point of view when WEU is tasked u'ith conducting a mission on behalf of the EU;
2. Work actively, in the light of the Washington Summit and the Bremen Declaration, on the gradual
integration of WEU in the EU, ensuring that the involvement of the WEU associate members and
associate partners in European defence policy is maintained, u,hile preserving the parliamurtary scrutiny
hitherto exercised by the Assembly of WEU;
3. Create a highJevel politico-military coordinating body chaired by the Secretary4eneral, to avoid
any divergence of political and military opinions bcfore strategic options are submitted to the Council;
4. Secure better use of the Torrejon Satellite Centre during a crisis, by placing it under the opera-
tional command of the WEU Military Staff;
5. Formally place the Military Staffunder the authority of the Secretary-General in order to provide
Europe rvith a quick-response and effective defence instrument:
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6. Reinforce the Military Stafl particularly in the areas of intelligence and planning, in order to
provide WEU with a good capacity for preparing strategic options;
7. lncrease the resources of the Situation Centre beyond their present level in order to turn it into a
proper crisis-management centre complete with the requisite communications and visual display equip-
ment;
8. See to it that Europe acquires an autonomous chain of operational command independent of any
decision taken outside the European framework, and to this end:
create a permanent, multinational and combined "Operation Commander's" core headquar-
ters;
set up a joint "Force Commander's" headquarters to be a real European CJTF headquarters,
which could be based on an existing European multinational force such as the European
Corps;
9. Continue to develop NATO-WEU relations, particularly as regards making NATO assets and
capabilities available to WEU;
10. Request that SHAPE appoint an officer at the rank of general responsible in normal times for
running the European pillar of the Alliance and designating officers for a dedicated headquarters,
I 1. Make sure that it is possible to set up a European chain of command lvithin NATO in the event
of a WEU-led operation, avoiding the designation of Deputy SACEUR as "Operation Commander",
12. Develop a very active WEU exercise policy providing frequent training opportunities for all the
players involved in the decision-making process in the event of a crisis;
13. Inform the Assembly of the results of the audit carried out with a view to evaluating the real ca-
pabilities of the forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
14. Participate in coordinating the training of European multinational forces;
15. Urge EU governments to make the budgetary effort required to supply their forces with modem
high-performance equipment, giving priority to all European cooperative efforts in the defence industry
sector, and striving in particular to remedy deficiences in the fields of intelligence, strategic mobility and
long-range high-precision lveaponry;
16. Call on governments to set up, within the framework of the current FAWEU concept, a proper
European lntervention Force, placed permanently under the orders of a European Chief-of-Staff and
which would constitute a "pool" of forces for rapid intervention.
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Exp lan atory M emo r on du m
sabmiued by Mrs Calleja, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
l. Since 1992, Ministers of the member
states of WEU have agreed that the Organisation
should carry out peace-support missions of the
so-called Petersberg t-rpe. Since 1991, there has
been provision in the Maastricht Treaty. re-
affirmed by Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty,
for the European Union to avail itself of WEU
for activities calling for the use of military assets.
Thus WEU must develop its organisation and
stand in readiness for crisis-management opera-
tions under the authority of the Council of WEU.
2. As recalled by the French Defence Minis-
ter, Mr Richard. in his address to the Assembly
of WEU, and in accordance with the decisions
taken by,the WEU Council of Ministers:
'-Defence Europe must learn to stand on its
own t\4,o feet, in other words, make pro-
gress both within the Atlantic Alliance and
independently; for the effect ofthe second
of those developments. far from running
counter to the first, can only help to fur-
ther it. This is precisely what the wording
of the Saint Malo document implies."
3. Lending force to the Saint Malo Declara-
tion, the British Prime Minister, Mr Blair, in a
speech delivered at the Royal United Services
Institute on 8 March 1999, referred to Europe's
military capabilities and sought to srengthen
political resolve for giving greater credibility to
Europe's CFSP:
"Europe's military capabilities at this
stage are modest. Too modest. To streng-
then NATO and to make European def-
ence a realiqv, we Europeans need to
restructure our defence capabilities so that
we can project force, can deploy our
troops, ships and planes beyond their home
bases and sustain them there, equipped to
deal with whatever level of conflict they
may face... The declaration (...) at Saint
Malo rvas the first step to defining the new
approach. We decided to go beyond the
Berlin rurangements agreed by NATO in
1996 to give Europe a genuine capacity to
act, and act quickly, in cases where the
Alliance as a lvhole is not militarily en-
gaged."
4. WEU has often been atar9et for criticism
concerning both its capabilities and decision-
making process. We must therefore take stock of
what exists 
- 
procedures. structures within the
Secretariat-General, headquarters and forces 
- 
in
order to propose the improvements needed to
provide us with an efficient European instrument
for crisis management.
II. Operation during crises
of llEU bodies in conjunction with
ot h er intern ation a I or g o nis ation s
5. Since the Ministerial Council in Petersberg
in June 1992,the Council of WEU has approved
numerous documents on the operation of WEU
during crises, WEU's operational development,
the measures to be taken in the event of humani-
tarian intervention, etc.
6. Holvever, crisis-management mechanisms
and procedures evolve over time according to
ministerial decisions, developments in other in-
ternational organisations and the experience gath-
ered from previous operations and exercises. We
are describing here the situation as presented to
your Rapporteur at the beginning of 1999, but it
must be borne in mind that the texts defining the
role and mandate of the different WEU bodies
are continually being updated.
1. General observations on
the development of crises
7. The Council of WEU, the Organisation's
decision-making body, can easily be convened in
Brussels at the level of the Permanent Represen-
tatives of member countries. It is with the Coun-
cil that the responsibility lies in an emerging
crisis for monitoring and assessing the situation
and possibly taking the decision to act in a WEU
framework although the decision to actually par-
ticipate in operations is a matter for the member
or associate countries.
8. For Petersberg missions, WEU has a
choice betlveen two modes of operation: either a
mission using national and multinational head-
quarters provided by WEU nations, or one which
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uses NATO assets and capabilities. Generally
speaking, the WEU Operation HQ will be a com-
bined and joint structure.
9. Crisis management by WEU calls first and
foremost for numerous exchanges of information.
followed by consultations among WEU member
countries and the various WEU organs involved
in the crisis-management process. In parallel, a
consultation process is established among the
relevant international organisations (EU, UN,
NATO, WEU, Council of Europe), lvith the aim
of providing the Council with the means to define
its policy.
10. The Council must then choose the means
for implementing that policy by defining the
mission, command structures and forces com-
positibn.
I l. Once the formal decision to take action in
a WEU framework has been taken. the Council
will assume the political control and strategic
direction of the operation.
12. All these decisions rvill be taken as part of
a process of information exchange and consulta-
tion during the course of the crisis, which can be
divided into four phases:
crisis build-up phase;
preparation of the choice of strategic
option;
- 
decision-making phase: choice of the
mode of action and the political and
military chain of command for the con-
duct ofoperations:
political control and conduct of opera-
tions.
2. Crisis build-up phase
13 As the crisis escalates it is the Council
w'hich decides rvhether to address the crisis situ-
ation. This initial phase includes crisis moni-
toring and assessment, and involves the partici-
pation of associate partners, unless decided
otheru.ise by the Council. In examining a crisis
situation, the Council defines its political objec-
tives and assesses the possible role of WEU.
14. In order to assess the crisis situation, the
Council requests the Politico-Military Group,
rvith the support of the Secretariat-General, the
Militarv Staff and the Satellite Centre, as re-
quired, to monitor developments and report back
to the Council. If the Satellite Centre has not
previously been tasked to carry'out general sur-
veillance of the emerging crisis. it may be issued
by the Council with the necessary directives to do
so. On request- the Military Committee, consist-
ing of the Chiefs of Defence Statr(CHODs), and
the Military Delegates Committee (MDC), may
be convened to study and advise on the militafy
and operational aspects ofthe crisis.
15. Separate from this early stage of inde-
pendent WEU monitoring. various European
Union bodies will have been assessing and re-
porting on the emergent crisis situation to the EU
Council. In particular, the lvork of the EU Politi-
cal Committee (as provided for in Article J.15 of
the Treat-v on European Union), rvhich is to
monitor the international situation in the areas
covered by the common foreign and security
policy (CFSP) and to deliver policy definitions
and opinions to the Council, shall be instrumental
in initiating first contact with WEU. On the basis
of the Political Committee's recommendation, the
EU Council may request WEU to assess the
situation in more detail and consider the possi-
bilities of an operation. The European Commis-
sion, the Presidency and the member states may
also be fully associated in the early stages of
monitoring and the interaction between the EU
and WEU.
16. Further to this, the Final Act of the Am-
sterdam Treaty made provision for an EU Policy
Planning and Early Warning Unit to be estab-
lished in the General Secretariat of the EU
Council, under the authorit_v of its Secretary-
General, also designated High Representative for
the CFSP. This unit- rvith its personnel drawn
from the EU General Secretariat and Commis-
sion, on the one hand- and WEU on the other,
rvill enhance inter-institutional monitoring cap-
abilities and improve the efficiency of informa-
tion exchange.
17 The independent monitoring work of WEU
is reinforced by information exchange betrveen
WEU and NATO. Each informs the other,
through the respective secretariats and in close
coordination with the WEU Presidency, about the
results of its examinations, and either organisa-
tion may request a joint Council meeting. lnfor-
mation exchange may also take place on a mrm-
ber of other levels, at joint meetings between the
relevant bodies. The range of inter-institutional
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contacts between WEU and NATO is broad and
comprehensive:
at the Chiefs of Defence Stafflevel;
between the Council Working Group
(WELI) and the Political Committee
(NArO);
between the Politico-Military Group
(WE[I) and the Policy Coordination
Group (PCGAIATO);
between the Military Delegates Com-
mittee (WE[I) and the Military Com-
mittee in permanent session (NATO);
between the WEU Military Statr(WEU
MS) and the NATO lnternational Mili-
tary Statr(IMS);
and between the WEU Military Staff
and the NATO Combined Joint Plan-
ning Statr(CPJS).
18. The next procedure is the drawing up by
the Military Staffof generic plans appropriate to
the situation. Here, the Situation Centre and the
lntelligence Section of the WEU MS keep the
Council informed of the latest developments. On
the basis of the Director of the Military Staffs
requirements, the Council decides whether or not
to reinforce the Situation Centre with national
military experts. Additional intelligence about the
crisis may also be requested from nations and
international organisations. This supply of intel-
ligence and strategic information to the WEU
Military Staffis organised in accordance with the
guidelines drawn up by the Politico-Military
Group.
19. Other options and facilities are available to
the Council for assessing the situation and updat-
ing intelligence. Firstly. the Council may decide
to send a fact-finding mission, consisting of dip-
lomatic and military elements, or in the case of a
humanitarian or rescue operation, to establish a
needs assessment team. Secondly, the Satellite
Centre is available to the Council for updated
information. And finany, the Council may acti-
vate the plaruring process of the Logistics and
Movements Section of the Plarming Cell. The
work of this section comprises the planning for
logisic and medical support and for strategic
mobility and transportatiorq and is carried out
with support from the Western European Logis-
tics Group (working at l3), with access to
NATO's deployment and movement system
(ADAMS)- in cooperation with SHAPE and
NATO's new communications agency (NC3A),
and in close contact with organisations such as
the UN's Deparffnent of Humanitarian Affairs
and the European Commission Humanitarian Of-
fice.
20. Once it has drawn together ttre situation
monitoring and preliminary planning results, the
Politico-Military Group, after having sought the
advice of the Military Delegates Committee and
with the support of both the Secretariat and the
Military Staff, presents to the Council its politi-
cal and military options.
21. At ttre end of this first phase, after both
internal and joint consultations have taken place,
if a WEU-led operation using NATO assets and
capabilities is envisaged, the WEU Council will
request NATO to pursue this option. Such a re-
quest will be a general one only, without specify-
ing the concrste needs for assets and capabilities.
In reply, the North Atlantic Council will give its
assent in principle.
3. heparation of strdegic options
22. Following the presentation of political and
military options to the Council by the Politico-
Military Group, the second phase of crisis man-
agement deals with examining the potential
courses of action for WEU and arriving at an
agreed contingency plan. This second phase is set
in motion if the Council, on the basis of its pre-
liminary work and consultations with nations and
intemational organisations, decides to consider
possible WEU involvement in the crisis situation.
As with the initial crisis build-up phase, asso-
ciate partners may be involved in the preparation
and planning of a mission, unless the Council
decides otherwise.
23. The impetus for initiating the second phase
of crisis management may also come from the
EU Council. The EU Council, deciding on an EU
joint action or common position (in accordance
with the voting provisions of Article J.l3 of the
Amsterdam Treaty) may avail itself of WEU
(under Article J.7 of the same) to elaborate and
implement its decisions.
24. ln either event the WEU Council proceeds
by issuing an initial planning directive for the
Military Staffto evaluate the selected options.
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25. [n the cases where a WEU-led operation
using NATO assets and capabilities has been
envisaged, the WEU Council may request that
NATO coordinate the production of a WEU
contingency plan. In this event, D/SACEUR will
direct the work of the Combined Joint Planning
Staff in conjunction with the International Mili-
tary StaflCapabilities Coordination Cell and the
Major NATO Commands on the NATO side,
and with the Militarl' Staff on the WEU side.
The exchange of liaison officers between the two
sides will also be helpful at this point.
26. The initial planning directive dictates the
remit of the contingency planning work, and the
contingency plans, adapted from the generic
plans of the crisis build-up phase, lvill cover the
following points:
the mission of the force and the forces
required to implement the different op-
tions, taking into account the various
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
the arrangements for the command and
control of the mission, including pro-
posals for the selection of operation
headquarters and of the nation which is
to provide this;
- 
the principles guiding the rules of en-
gagement (ROEs);
the necessity for any additional assets
and capabilities in the light of possible
shortfalls;
the initial forecasts for logistic support,
movetnent, transportation, medical
support, civilian-military cooperation
(CIMIC), and the financial and legal
implications of the operation;
the contributions, as deemed appropri-
ate, of participating observer states in
reinforcing the Planning Cell.
27. Given the amount and complexity of the
Military Staffs work at this stage, it can estab-
lish and direct planning support from the WEU
Mobility Coordination Group $IMCG) and the
WEU Logistics Coordination Group $fLCG).
The function of these groups is threefold:
to initiate and coordinate the prepara-
tion ofdeplolrnent and logistic support
options;
to assist in drafting the movements and
transportation logistic elernents for the
final contingency plan;
to analyse national responses to an
eventual Declaration of Intent Request
(DIR) message, in light of the logistics
requirements of the contingency op-
tions.
28. The contingency plan is dralvn up by the
Military Staff, in liaison rvith national headquar-
ters and those of multinational forces. and will
incorporate the selected options set out in the
initial planning directive. The submissions by
nations of their own plaruring work, with refer-
ence to the FAWEU list, will also ensure, in
principle, that the necessary military means can
be assembled in the required time-frames. NATO
procedures will apply in identiffing the required
NATO assets and capabilities. Attached to the
contingancy plan will be an Intelligence Annex,
also drawn up by the Military Staff under the
guidelines sst out by the Politico-Military Group.
The intelligence support of national headquarters
will also take into account the needs formulated
by the Politico-Military Group and the advice of
the Military Delegates Committee.
29. This plan is submiued to the Chiefs of
Defence Staff or their military delegates for
comment. It is also examined by the Military
Delegates Committee and by the Politico-Mili-
tary Group. The Director of the Military Staff
then presents the finalised contingency plan to the
WEU Council, highlighting the advantages and
disadvantages of each option in terms of feasibil-
ity, risks and costs. Where NATO assets and
capabilities are required, the plan also goes be-
fore the NATO Council.
30. [t is also sent to capitals, together with the
Declaration of Intent Request (DIR) message.
This procedure aims to provide the Military Staff
with a more formal and concrete indication of the
possible participation of each nation, because in
response to the DIR message, nations are ex-
pected to indicate the nature and scale of their
contemplated contributions, using specific refer-
ences to the FAWEU list of units, and stating
any planned contribution of additional forces.
31. On receipt of the responses to the DIR
message, the Military Staff is able to assess the
extent to which its requirements (as sst out for
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each contingency option) may be met. By identi-
Sing possible shortfalls, the Military Staff is
able to adjust its military analyses regarding the
potential of forces available. [n addition, the
Military Staff considers the capabilities of avail-
able headquarters and makes the appropriate re-
commendations to the Council. If there is a need
for a combined, multinational joint headquarters,
the Military Staff will also take account of the
need for reinforcements.
32. After advising the Military Delegates
Committee and the Politico-Military Group on
these force contributions and the feasibility of
each option, the Military Staff proposes the fol-
lorving elements of a military operation to the
Council:
the mission and composition of the
force;
the arrangements for operational com-
mand and control;
the principles guiding the rules of en-
gagement (ROEs);
the available assets and capabilities;
and the arangements for implementa-
tion.
The Military Delegates Committee and Politico-
Military Group also submit political and military
advice on the proposed options to the Council.
,1. Formal decision to take qction:
choice of the mode of action and of
the political und mililary chain of command
33. There are three possible courses ofacfion
that the Council may take once the different op-
tions have been submitted to it together with the
necessary information and advice it needs to take
a decision. It may:
select an option and decide on action by
WEU;
continue to monitor the development of
the situation while ensuring that the dif-
ferent options are kept up to date and
fleshed out, which means postponing
the decision;
decide against action by WEU.
34. If the first course of action is taken, the
Council must instruct the Military Staff to draw
up, on the basis of the chosen option, a directive
for the command of the designated operation,
defining the nature of the mission, the organisa-
tion of the operation command structures, the
forces that have been allocated and the arrange-
ments for conducting the mission, as well as
specifting the rules of engagement.
35. In cases where it has been decided to call
on NATO assets and capabilities, the chosen op-
tion must be submitted to the North Atlantic
Council. tf the Alliance decides to support this
WEU-led operation- the directive for the desig-
nated Operation Commander, who may, in this
instance, be D/SACEU& will be drawn up in
close cooperation with SHAPE and/or the CJPS.
36. At this juncture, the Council must formally
designate the Operation Commander and Head-
quarters and appoint a Force Commander to di-
rect operations on the ground. In cases where
WEU avails itself of NATO assets and capabili-
ties, this choice must be made in close coopera-
tion with the North Atlantic Council.
37. The draft directive for the Operation
Commander drawn up by the Military Staff rvill
then be submiued to the Military Delegates
Committee (MDC) for approval, before being
conveyed to the Politico-Military Group (PMG)
for submission to the Council. After approval by
the Council it will be conveyed to the Operation
Commander.
38. On the basis of this directive, the Opera-
tion Commander will prepare an Operation Plan
in close cooperation rvith D/SACEUR and the
relevant NATO staffs, in cases where Alliance
assets and capabilities are being used. During
this phase it is necessary for a group of officers
from the Military Staffto liaise with the Opera-
tion HQ in order to guarantee some degree of
continuity. particularly with regard to the prin-
ciples applied to the chosen option. Particular
care will be given to elaborating the rules of en-
gagement.
39. At this stage of the process and on the ba-
sis of the draft Operation Plan, the Military Staff
will ask the participating countries to designate
forces for the operation. This in turn will allow
the WEU bodies in charge of coordinating mo-
bility and logistics to help the Operation Com-
mander complete the military support, mobility
and logistics parts of the Operation Plan. During
this phase there is a close dialogue between the
l0
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Operation Commander, the Military Staffand the
national representatives in order to streamline
requirements and the various national contribu-
tions, with particular attention being given to
interoperability aspects.
40. The Operation Plan is then submitted to
the WEU Council for approval, and possibly also
to the North Atlantic Council for comment, in
cases where use is being made of NATO assets
and capabilities. Once approval has been given,
the Operation Commander rvill proceed with as-
sembling forces. Associate partner countries con-
tributing forces will at this stage be incorporated
into the Council's decision-making process.
41. In cases where the EU Council has availed
itself of WEU to elaborate and implement its de-
cisions, the EU Council is briefed and receives
written information on the WEU Operation Plan.
In turn, the WEU Council is briefed and receives
written information on the parallel complemen-
tary action being taken under other EU pillars.
5. Political control und conduct ofoperations
42. The WEU Council exercises political con-
trol over the conduct of the operation. It will in-
volve in its deliberations the associate partner
countries participating in it. The Council, as-
sisted by, the politico-military bodies of the Sec-
retariat-General and by the Military Stafl will
monitor the situation, examine requests from the
Operation Commander and on that basis regu-
larly draw up politico-military directives.
43. The Operation Commander, or. if he is
unavailable, the Director of the Military Staff,
must personally report to the Council on the
military situation.
44. In practice. it is the Politico-Military
Group, in close cooperation lvith the Military
Staffand onthe advice of the Military Delegates
Committee, lvhich presents an analysis of the
situation and prepares "political" opinions for the
Council. This Group provides an interface with
other bodies and organisations, as well as with
the countries participating in the operation. It
also finalises the drafting of the politico-military
directives for the Council.
45. The function of "point of contact" (POC),
is normally fulfilled by the Director of the WEU
Military Stafi who has many responsibilities
during the conduct of the operation. His first task
is to provide an interface between the relevant
WEU bodies and authorities (the Council, Polit-
ico-Military Group, Military Delegates Commit-
tee etc.) and the Operation Commander, with the
support of the Situation Centre. He must also
follow up the requests of the Operation Com-
mander and see to it that the replies are conveyed
back to him. In emergencies he organises meet-
ings of the relevant WEU bodies.
46. ln the case of operations using NATO as-
sets, the WEU Council will keep the North At-
lantic Council informed about the conduct of
operations and use of NATO assets, in accord-
ance with the procedures defined in the NATO/
WEU framelvork agreement. Joint meetings may
be organised as called for by the circumstances.
47. Where an EU Council decision has been
implemented by WEU, coordinated meetings take
place betlveen the relevant bodies ofeach organi-
sation. Although it is the WEU Council which
exercises political control and gives strategic di-
rection throughout the operation, the EU Council
maintains responsibility for overall policy and
considers the political follolv-up of the operation.
48. When the WEU Council decides to termi-
nate an operation, a directive explaining the
lvithdrawal strategy is conveyed to the Operation
Commander.
III. Anolysis of WEU capabilities
1. Politico-military b odies :
prepordion of Council decisions
(i ) P o li ti c o -Mi li tary Gr oup
49. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is
responsible for monitoring the development of
crises on behalf of the Council and reporting
back to it. This Group is composed of delega-
tions of all member countries and is chaired by
the Political Director of the Secretariat-General.
It may meet at 2l or 28. Normally, each national
delegation will be composed of both diplomatic
and military representatives.
50. The PMG commences its task of monitor-
ing a crisis when instructed to do so by the
Council. It uses for this purpose the situation
assessment provided by the Military Staffas well
as the more frequent information coming from
the Situation Centre.
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51. During the phase of decision-making by
the Council, the PMG prep:ues strategic options
based on advice given by the Military Commit-
tee, to which it adds a "political" point of view.
As soon as ttre crisis begins to build up, the
Council tasks the PMG with liaisrng with other
international organisations :
in the case ofNATO, its liaison parmer
will normally be the Policy Coordina-
tion Group (PCG);
in the case ofthe EU, it will be COSEC
(Commiuee on Security).
52. Once the Amsterdam Treaty is imple-
mented, the High Representative for the CFSP
will have the EU Policy Planning and Early
Warning Unit at his/her disposal. This body will
then be responsible for liaising rvith WEU's Pol-
itico-Military Group.
(i i) Mi li tary C ommi tt e e/fuIi litary D e le gate s
Committee
53. The WEU Military Committee (MC) is
composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff
(CHODs) of member countries. [t meets twice a
year, or onanad hocbasis during a crisis, under
the Chairmanship of the CHOD of the country
holding the Presidency of WEU.
54. Its day-to-day work in WEU is conducted
at the level of the Military Delegates Committee
(MDC), rvhich can easily be convened at the
level of ttre Permanmt Representatives of the
CHODs in Brussels. It is chaired by the Director
of the WEU Military Statr In the event of a cri-
sis, the MDC examines the strategic options pro-
posed by the Military Staff before advising the
Council of the option it considers the most ap-
propriate.
55. The Director of the Military Stafl as the
permanent Chairman of the MDC, has contacts
with NATO. He may attend certain meetings of
NATO's Military Committee in accordance with
the agreed procedures. In turn, the Chairman of
the NATO Military Committee may be invited to
meetings of the WEU Military Committee.
2, Military Staff: prepardion of strdegic options
56. In the field of crisis management, the main
task, under normal circumstances, of the WEU
Military Staffis to monitor potential crisis areas.
57. [n an emerging crisis, the Military Staff is
the driving force behind WEU's strategic
evaluation. Its task is to gather and analyse intel-
ligence in order to keep its assessment up to date,
participate in the politico-military analysis of the
situation in close liaison with the Military Dele-
gates Committee and the Politico-Military Group
and propose strategic options (strategic plan-
"i"g)58. During this decision-making process, it
remains in close contact with the other interna-
tional organisations involved in the crisis and is
able to second small liaison tearns to them.
59. The Military Staffis composed of 45 offi-
cers, of which only six are in the lntelligence
Section. Progress has been made in the area of
intelligence and relations with the Satellite Centre
have developed considerably, but according to
the Director of the Military Stafl they have yet
to reach a stage, desirable in his view, in which
he would be entitled to set tasks for the Satellite
Centre. As regards electronic data interchange,
the installation of a NATO BICES system termi-
nal will make for considerable improvement, in
that it will allow exchanges of data in real time
with most WEU states.
60. Finally, the Director of the Military Staff
considers that the quality of the strategic options
proposed by his Staff depends on the experience
and level of its officers, 'which means that there
must be a sufficient number of them to reflect a
broad range of military expertise and experience.
3. Conduc't of operdions
61. As mentioned earlier in the chapter on the
operation of WEU in the event of a crisis, com-
bined military headquarters at three separate
levels are required for the preparation and con-
duct of military operations:
the WEU Military Staffis in charge of
preparing strategic options for a deci-
sion by the Council;
the Operation Commander's headquar-
ters, located at strategic level in a
European country, is in charge of mili-
tary planning and then, during the op-
eration itself of providing an interface
between the political authority. in this
instance the WEU Council, and the
forces on the ground;
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the combined services headquarters of
the Force Commander, located at op-
erational level. can be projected and
deployed under normal circumstances
in or close to the theatre of operations.
It is the equivalent of NATO's CJTF
HQ concept. In practice, for SFOR and
IFOR in Bosnia, this function was
tulfilled by the CINCSOUTH HQ in
Naples, a real combined headquarters.
For small-scale operations, t}e Force
and Operation Commander levels can
be combined.
62. Finally. the HQ on the ground rvill often
be a land-based element to which a multi-service
component that can be added as required to pro-
vide the necessary liaison between the different
branches of the armed forces. In the case of
SFOMFOR, this role rvas played in Sarajevo by
a single-service HQ, the NATO Rapid Reaction
Corps (ARRC), for what was initially a 30 000-
strong force.
(i) Role of the WEU Military Staff
63. The WEU MS, by definition, is not in-
volved in conducting the operation itself, because
it is a strategic planning body. It is the headquar-
ters of the Operation Commander designated by
the Council lvhich is responsible for drawing up
the operation plan (operational planning). Horv-
ever, in the initial operational planning phase, the
WEU MS sends a liaison element to the Opera-
tion Commander in order to inform him about the
strategic option adopted by the Council and con-
vey to him all the information that the WEU MS
has on the crisis situation.
64. Furthermore, the WEU MS Director lvill
normalll' act as the "point of contact" between
the lvhole Secretariat-General and Military Staff
on the one hand, and the Operation Commander
on the other. which means that he must have a
permanent system for monitoring developments.
This is provided by the Situation Centre, which is
responsible for monitoring the WEU operation as
it unfolds in order to keep the Politico-Military
Group supplied with the information it needs to
prepare Council decisions. For this purpose it
remains in close contact with the Operation
Commander and conveys the requisite informa-
tion documents and situation assessments to all
relevant WEU bodies and to the delegations of
the Permanent Representatives. To perform these
tasks, the Situation Centre must have close con-
tacts with the Satellite Centre, the defence staffs
of all WEU nations and all international organi-
sations involved in the crisis: NATO, the EU and
possibly also the UN, OSCE and various NGOs.
(ii) Chain of command with NATO involvement
65. At the moment of choice of the strategic
option- the Council may decide to submit a for-
mal request to NATO for the use of its assets and
capabilities in a WEU-led operation. For the Al-
liance. this entails implementing the procedures
agreed rvith WEU subsequent to the NATO
Ministers' June 1996 Berlin Declaration- in
which they referred to the development of the
European Security and Defence Identity within
NATO:
"This identity will (...) permit the creation
of militarily coherent and effective forces
capable of operating under the political
control and strategic direction ofWEU".
Furthermore. this Declaration lays down three
guiding principles for the implementation of the
ESDI:
prior identification of the NATO assets
and capabilities 
- 
in particular the
headquarters, HQ elements and support
capabilities - that would be made
available to Europeans;
elaboration of European command ar-
rargements for conducting WEU-led
operations. This principle implies des-
ignating and training appropriate per-
sonnel (the European elements within
the HQs) rvho would perform a dual 
-
Atlantic and European function
("double-hatting");
peacetime planning and training in re-
spect of the different assets and cap-
abilities in order to ensure that they
function effectively as a coherent mili-
tary whole.
66. We note that good progress has been made
within the Alliance in this area. The preparations
for exercises to implement the CJTF (Combined
Joint Task Forces) concept, as lvell as Crisex-
type exercises- have served to draw up a list of
those NATO assets rvhich could be made avail-
able to WEU. These consist essentially of:
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American heavy assets: logistic trans-
port aircraft. observation satellites (al-
though Europe has access to Helios
images through the Torrej6n Satellite
Centre);
specific NATO assets, which are rare:
AWACS (although some WEU coun-
tries also have such aircraft);
NATO command assets, communica-
tion equipment. HQ or HQ-support ele-
ments. including CJTF (Combined
Joint Task Forces) HQs.
67. In order to have combined joint headquar-
ters deployable in the theatre of operations and
ready to be made available to WEU, on the basis
of a decision by the North Atlantic Council, the
Alliance has decided to designate in its "parent
headquarters" a core staff which could be
strengthened on request with elements supplied
by other NATO or national bodies. Such a CJTF
HQ concept allorvs a flexible. multinational ap-
proach which could, if required, be extended to
include countries which are not full members of
WEU. This r,vas the principle used for the
IFOR/SFOR HQ in Bosnia.
68. The WEU CJTF HQs would be set up in
the same tvay as those of NATO and placed un-
der the orders of an Operation Commander who.
in turn, rvould come under the political control of
the WEU Council. As the operation continued,
replacement of personnel would allow the CJTF
HQ to reflect those nations taking part in that
particular WEU-led operation. However, NATO
nations have already agreed, in principle, that
these designated NATO CJTF HQs will in fact
be provided regardless of the national contribu-
tion.
69. As regards the European chain of com-
mand within NATO, the June 1996 Berlin Decla-
ration is quite clear and the question is lvhether
the intentions expressed at that time have been
followed by deeds. Indeed- this Declaration refers
to the:
"elaboration of appropriate multinational
European command arrangements rvithin
NATO. consistent with and taking full ad-
vantage ofthe CJTF concept, able to pre-
pare, support, command and conduct the
WEU-led operations. This implies double-
hatting appropriate personnel within the
NATO command structure to perform
these functions. Such European command
arrangements should be identifiable (...)".
70. According to your Rapporteur's informa-
tion, the two organisations are trying to reach
agreement on the principle of the European Gen-
eral appointed Depuw SACEUR at SFIAPE
(Mons) playing a specifically European role,
considering him, in particular. as an ideal candi-
date for the post of Operation Commander for a
WEUJed operation. If he lvas not chosen for thatjob- D/SACEUR would remain in charge of
coordinating the NATO support provided to
WEU.
71. If D/SACEUR were indeed to assume that
function- the headquarters of the Operation Com-
mander would be the SHAPE headquarters from
which the "double-hatted" officers would be
chosen.
(iii) Independent chain of command
72. According to the decisions taken by the
WEU Council. operations conducted "under the
political control and strategic direction of WEU"
can be organised in one offi,vo ways:
an autonomous operation based on na-
tional or multinational headquarters
provided by WEU states:
or an operation using NATO assets and
capabilities, and in particular its com-
mand assets, as described above.
73. Furthermore- it should be recalled that the
Council may decide to give support to an opera-
tion carried out by one or several WEU states,
without exercising politico-military control over
that operation.
74. We have established the need for head-
quarters at three different levels:
- 
one level for the preparation. in an
autonomous European capaciry'. of
strategic options (WEU Military Staff);
the levels of Operation Commander
(OPCDR) and of Force Commander.
with a headquarters- possibly of the
CJTF HQ !vpe, which can be projected
and deployed in the theatre of opera-
tions, pose a problem in the absence of
a permanent WEU command structure.
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75. This is rvhv WEU has adopted a fleible
concept making use of available capabilities.
with the core and infrastructure needed to build
headquarters being made available either by one
nation 
- 
the "framework nation" concept 
- 
or bv
sel'eral nations- drau,ing on an existing multina-
tional headquarters.
76. At Operation Commander level. WEU
member countries have proposed eight national
combined headquarters. An evaluation is cur-
rentll, being made of their actual capabilities,
taking into account the ease rvith rvhich they'can
be tumed into multinational headquarters, as u'ell
as various other criteria u'hich are currentlv be-
ing defined.
77. At Force Commander level, several coun-
trics have prepared core headquarters rvhich
could be made multinational. rvith the necessar)'
projectable equipment. Furthermore, studies are
under lvay on existing European multinational
headquarters. There are seven or eight potential
candidates. but all are composed of single-serv-
ice. generally land-based. elements.
J. Forces
78. The forces ansrverable to WEU (FAWELD.
a rvell-established concept since 1993. provide a
diverse set of military capabilities for a rvide
range of operational needs. The multinational
FAWEU. rvhich at present number seven. consti-
tute a large pool of forces for WEU to drau'
upon. These multinational military units, together
rvith their headquarters, are: the European Corps,
the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious force, the Multi-
national Division Centre. Eurofor (the Rapid De-
ploy'ment Euroforce), Euromarfor, the Spanish-
Italian Amphibious Force and the lst German-
Netherlands Corps.
79. The European Corps (Belgium, France,
Germanl,- Luxembourg and Spain) rvas desig-
nated a FAWEU in May 1993. and is composed
of the I st Belgian Mechanised Division, the
Franco-German Brigade, the lst French Ar-
moured Division- the lOth German Armoured
Division. the l0th Spanish Mechanised Infantry
Brigade, and a reconnaissance companv from
Luxembourg. The European Corps at full
strength is composed of some 80 000 troops.
80. The Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force.
designated a FAWEU in May 1993, is made up
of four Infantry Bat[alions (three British, one
Dutch). one Anglo-Dutch Artillery Battalion and
trvo Boats Companies. This force constitutes a
rapidly deployable landing force of some 6 500
troops.
81. The Multinational Division Centre
(Belgium. Germany,. the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom) r,vas designated a FAWEU in
November 1993. It consists of a Belgian Air-
borne Brigade, the 3lst German Airbome Bri-
gade. thc I lth Dutch Airmobile Brigade. the 24th
British Airmobile Brigade and five Battalions of
Division Troops. ln total. this constitutes a force
of some 20 000 troops.
82. Eurofor (the Rapid Deployment Euroforce
rvith units from France, Italy, Portugal and
Spain) became a FAWEU in November 1995. It
consists of three units 
- 
a I OO0-strong battalion-
level unit, a 3 000-strong brigade-level unit and a
10 00O-strong division-level unit, and has a total
strength ofabout l4 000 troops.
83. Euromarfor (France- [taly,, Portugal and
Spain) rvas also designated a FAWEU in Nov-
ember 1995. It is a non-standing, pre-structured
maritime force rvith both maritime and amphibi-
ous capabilities. composed of operational ele-
ments ready to be brought together at short no-
tice. A typical composition lvould include one
aircraft carrier, four to six escort units- a landing
force of maximum brigade size. amphibious ves-
sels of the landing force and one combat resupply
vessel.
84. The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force.
designated a FAWEU in October 1997, is an-
other non-permanent, pre-structured force. In the
event of its deploynent, its national amphibious
components lvould retain their orvn operational
chains of command. The naval component of the
force is formed from the 3rd Italian Naval Divi-
sion and the Delta Group of the Spanish Fleet.
Other naval assets are also available- as required
for an operation. The landing force component
rvould be generated and assembled on a com-
monly agreed structure, rvhich rvould mean that
either nation could provide the basic command
structure and units- and have them supplemented
by additional staff and units from the other na-
tion. The force would be of brigade size, of
roughly 4 000 troops. Overall command respon-
sibility is rotated every two years between the
tlvo nations. Only a small number of officers
form the force's permanent element.
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85. The lst German-Netherlands Corps, made
a FAWEU in November 1997, comprises a Ger-
man Armoured Division, a Dutch Mechanised
Division and a Support Group. The Corps. with
its HQ in Miinster. can provide planning support
to WEU missions as rvell as some 40 000 troops.
86. In addition to the multinational forces an-
swerable to WEU, there are several national
FAWEU. These are military units or headquar-
ters which have been designated by states to be
made available to the authority of WEU on a
case-b\,-case basis. As u'ell as tle units desig-
nated by WEU's ten member states, Norwa1,,
Turkey, Austria- Finland and Sweden and each
of the associate partners have specified units
which could carry out WEU missions. Further-
more, on 30 June 1997, a cooperation agreement
signed with Ukraine made provision for tlre use
of Ukraine's long-haul air transport assets in
support ofthe Petersberg tasks.
87. It should be noted that each of these
FAWEU ma1,be engaged under the control of
either WEU or NATO for missions of common
defence or Petersberg tasks. Eurofor and Euro-
marfor are constituted to carry out missions un-
der the auspices of both organisations with pri-
ority being given to WEU. Thus, this comple-
ment of multinational and of several national
forces and facilities serves to enhance Europe's
ou,n capacitl, for CFSP action as well as the
ESDI within the Transatlantic Alliance.
88. Of the FAWEU, the Anglo-Dutch Am-
phibious Force, first formed in 1973- has a long
record of exercises and operabilrt-v. Both Eurofor
and Euromarfor have carried out a series of ex-
ercises since their creation in 1995 and are fullv
operational. The European Corps has been the
only FAWEU to be engaged, with a representa-
tion of 150 officers serving at SFOR Headquar-
ters in Sarajevo under the command of NATO
since June of last year.
89. Relations betrveen the European Corps
Commander and the WEU Militarl' Staff are
governed by a special directive submitted by the
participating states and approved by the WEU
Council in June 1996. The directive fixes the
degree of mutual aid to be provided for planning
work on both sides and outlines the information
that the Corps must convey to WEU concerning
its operational capabilities.
90. Those concerned lvith restructuring Euro-
pean defence capabilities to be more effective can
look to the European Corps as an example of a
multinational force lvith a modular structure and
flexible emplovment to respond to its different
missions. The Corps can field:
a Light Immediate Force (LIF) of bri-
gade strength (3 000 to 5 000 troops)
for basicallv humanitarian and low-in-
tensity operations:
- 
a Mechanised Immediate Force (MIF)
of division strength (15 000 to 20 000
troops) for peacekeeping or peacemak-
ing operations:
and itself at full strength for missions
of common defence.
The challenge faced by the European
Corps, and indeed other FAWEU- according to
Lieutenant General Leo van den Bosch, Com-
mander of the European Corps, is to make un-
derstood the capabilities of these forces to those
who rvould use them.
IV Possible improvements
1. Preparation of the crisis-munugementtool
(i) Organisation of WEU
91. In the current WEU structure, the three
executive bodies the Secretariat-General.
Military Staffand Satellite Centre 
- 
each anslver
directly to the Council and have no hierarchical
link with each other. There are historical reasons
for this: at the time of the creation of the Torre-
j6n Satellite Centre, the Militarl' Statrdid not yer
exist and some WEU members did not agree rvith
the idea of this Centre producing intelligence files
on crisis zones, although this has since become
its main function. Since this intelligence is des-
tined for the Intelligence Section of the Military
Stafl it rvould make sense for the Satellite
Centre to come under the authority of the Mili-
tary Staffs Operation Commander, who could
then direct the Centre's activities in accordance
rvith Council directives and be responsible for
collating intelligence and checking the security of
data.
92. Similarly, the Secretary{eneral does not
have direct authority over the Military Staff and
so he is not able to manage a crisis situation
swiftly and efficiently. The desire to provide the
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European Union in the future with an effective
instrument for defence could lead to the Military
Staff being formally placed under the authority
of the Secretary-General, thus avoiding a t!vo-
headed structure answering directly to the
Council. The NATO example, whereby the Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
lvas to be heard making political statements at
the beginning of the air strikes in Serbia. is not to
be followed.
93. Furthermore, when the Politico-Military
Group, whose job is to prepare the Council's
decision and hence to express an opinion, pres-
ents the strategic options to the Council, there
must be an opportumty for the Milital-v Commit-
tee, possibly at the level of the Military Dele-
gates, to express an opinion to the Council.
94. Under the present s)'stem, the options pro-
posed by the Military Committee are conveyed
simultaneously to the Council and the Politico-
Military Group. The latter gives a detailed opin-
ion and may propose alternative options. There is
thus a risk that these new options, which may
have military implications- will be submitted to
the Council rvithout first having been evaluated
by the Military Committee. The procedure should
be for a joint politico-military meeting at Council
Working Group level to be held before the op-
tions are presented to the Council, to ensure that
the final proposals have been vetted by the Mili-
tary Delegates before their submission to the
Council.
(ii) Capacities of the Military Staff
95. The Military Staff has essentially nvo
tasks:
to frame all military aspects of Euro-
pean defence policy (an "organisation-
al" function);
to monitor potential crises and provide
strategic evaluations to the Council in
the event of a crisis, in the form of
contingency plans.
96. The Military Staff, with its complement of
45 officers, does not have sufficient manning
strength to deal properly with both tasks. Should
there be a transfer to the EU, the opportunity
should be seized to drarv up an inventory ofthe
Military Staffs functions and to match its re-
sources to the requirements of its role.
97. Presentations made to your Rapporteur in
Brussels revealed a number of deficiences in
connection with intelligence, the Situation Centre
and the strategic planning capability, which need
to be remedied as quickly as possible.
98. The Intelligence Sectio,n must be a genu-
inely "analytical" body which has close ties lvith
NATO member countries' intelligence sen'ices
and is equipped with the requisite data exchange
and processing facilities for exploiting that intel-
ligence. Moreover, given that the work done by
this group of experts will provide the basis for
decisions taken at European level, the figure of
some 20 officers 
- 
rather than the current figure
of six 
- 
has been put fonvard as a reasonable
estimate of the manning strength required if this
Section is to acquire a real assessment capabiliry'.
99. The current mission of the Situation
Centre is to participate, using non-confidential
sources, in the monitoring of crisis areas desig-
nated by the Council and in providing the Polit-
ico-Military Group rvith the information required
to prepare the Council for its crisis-management
decisions and political control over WEU opera-
tions. This mission calls for close contacts rvith
the Intelligence Section and the Torrej6n Satellite
Centre, as rvell as with the Operation and Force
Commanders' headquarters in the event of a cri-
sis.
100. [n practice, the Centre should be able to
draft situation reports and present its findings to
the various WEU bodies, including the Council.
The Situation Centre therefore needs to be up-
graded and transformed into a genuine crisis-
management centre complete lvith modern data
display equipment and premises that could be
used in times of crisis for the Council's informa-
tion and decision-making meetings.
101. As regards the stategic planning cap-
ability in the preparatory phase prior to the sub-
mission, first of all to the Militarl' Delegates
Committee, of the strategic options, recent stud-
ies carried out in connection with the reflection
process on a possible WEU-EU merger have
demonstrated that this is the crucial capability of
the Military Staff. The Operations Section can
only provide the necessary expertise in this area
if it is composed of a large number of officers
with a very broad range of skills and experience.
At the moment it comprises only seven offtcers.
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102. Finally, it is the Military Staffs job, once
the Council has made its choice among the stra-
tegic options presented in the contingency plan,
to conduct preliminary operational planning,
pending the start-up of the headquarters of the
designated Operation Commander. As rve have
already pointed out, teams of officers with ex-
pertise in the different areas must conduct opera-
tional planning and pass on that infonnation to
the Operation Commander's headquarters as
soon as possible, so as to avoid any time being
wasted in the period following the Council's de-
cision and the appointment of the Operation
Commander.
103. All the information collected by your Rap-
porteur, as well as a very cautious comparison
rvith NATO's lnternational Military Staff lvhich,
backed up by the NATO Combined Joint Plan-
ning Staff (CJPS) in Mons, has a staff comple-
ment of some 350 officers, indicates that WEU's
Military Staff needs a minimum of about 100
officers in order to do its job.
104. Your Rapporteur insists on the importance
of strengthening the Military Staffand underlines
that this does not mean unnecessary duplication,
but necessary plurality. Indeed. Europe's capac-
ity to autonomouslv elaborate strategic options
depends to a very large extent on the quality of
that Military Staff.
(iii) The quesfion of intelligence
105. The qualih,of the intelligence assessments
produced by the Military Staff is crucial for the
quality of the strategic options it puts fonvard in
an emerging crisis and directly determines the
relevance of the Council's crisis-management
decisions. The deficiencies of WEU's intelligence
policy have already been highlighted in previous
Assembly reports.r
106. The first measure that needs to be taken,
as emphasised by the Director of the Military
Stafl is to reinforce the Intelligence Section,
which, using NATO's lnternational Military
Staff and the national staffs of member states as
a yardstick, should have a complement of some
20 officers.
rS"" tt. report on WEU's operationalrole submitted
on 13 May 1997 by Mr Uftain, Assembly Document
1s67.
107. Furthermore, the Assembly has recom-
mended that each member state be asked to sec-
ond a member of its national intelligence services
to the Military Staff in order to enhance the lat-
ter's capability, which would give it the full
benefit of the analyses performed by the various
member countries,
108. This has not been done, as far as your
Rapporteur is aware. It must be admitted how-
ever, that now that a terminal of NATO's intelli-
gence transmission system BICES has been in-
stalled, the quality of the information collected by
the Intelligence Section both from NATO and
member states will be considerably improved,
particularly as regards its date. What still re-
mains to be done, holvever, is for member states
to designate points of contact rvithin their own
departrnents to keep WEU informed of develop-
ments during a crisis.
109. Finally, the Director of the Military Staff
should have the authority, once he has the ap-
proval of the Secretary-General and lvithout
waiting for a formal Council decision, to task the
Intelligence Section lvith assessments or the Sat-
ellite Centre rvith the monitoring of new emerging
crisis areas. This would enable events to be an-
ticipated and the Council to be informed at the
earliest possible moment and would save
valuable time during a fast-moving crisis situa-
tion.
(iv) WEU's exercise policy
I10. It can be seen from the description of the
process of decision-making by the Council, and
that of the planning and execution of military
operations under the political control and strate-
gic direction of WEU, that this is a complex
process, due to the involvement of so many dif-
ferent players and the need for international con-
sensus that is inherent in this type of organisa-
tion.
I11. To improve the functioning of WEU bod-
ies during a crisis in conjunction with the other
international organisations, these many different
players need to be trained, using exercise scen-
arios which are as close as possible to real-life
situations. Moreover, the lack of permanent
military command structures within WEU pres-
ents a problem that must be alleviated by a sus-
tained exercise policy.
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ll2. This policy is organised within WEU on
the basis of decisions taken by the Ministerial
Council. The Organisation's official documents
refer to three levels at which exercises ars re-
quired:
- 
the politico-military and strategic level,
involving the Secretariat-General, Mili-
tary Stafi national authorities and the
Operation Commander's HQ;
- 
the level of the Force Commander's
HQ;
possibly also the level of the forces
themselves- but that is the responsibil-
ity of individual states.
A WEU five-year exercise programme is annu-
ally updated at the WEU exercises conference
held at 28 at the beginning of every year.
ll3. During the drafting of this report, the
Military Staff and Secretariat-General impressed
upon us the importance of the lessons learned
from the latest exercises, in particular Crisex 98.
as well as from the on-going preparations for the
joint WEU/IIATO CM)VCrisex 2000 exercise,
which started r,vith a kick-off seminar in early
February 1999- and for rvhich the planning con-
ferences cycle has already begun.
l14. The Assembly, lvhich is aware of the cru-
cial role of exercises for enhancing WEU's cri-
sis-management capability, would wish to be
invited as an observer on the occasion of such
major exercises.
2. Crisis build-up and decision-making phuses
115. The process of analysing an escalating
crisis and preparing operational options de-
scribed at the start of this report, as conducted in
WEU, in fact involves a functional analysis of all
the steps that are necessary in any intemational
organisation involved in a crisis, r,vhether it be
NATO. WEU or, in the future, the EU. The
slowness of the decision-making procedures for
lvhich WEU is reproached is due essentially to
the reluctance of some countries to take action in
a crisis, due to a lack of political resolve. This is
not specific to WEU. In fact, the larger the num-
ber of full members in an organisation, the more
marked the phenomenon is likely to be: as a re-
minder, there are l0 full members in WEU, 15 in
the EU and now l9 in NATO.
116. An effort must be made to improve con-
tiacts among the intemational organisations in-
volved in this phase. While the consultation pro-
cedures are well developed between WEU and
NATO, implementation of Article 17 of the
Treaty on European Union is lagging somewhat
behind, as could be seen in the case of the EU
decision to task WEU rvith training for demining
opeiations in Croatia.
ll7. The main function of the Organisation as a
whole, and of its Military Staff in particular.
during this phase in the run-up to the decision by
the Council, is to prepare strategic options in the
form of a contingency plan. Careful considera-
tion must be given to that function in order to
enhance the quality of the options and analyses
submiued to the Council.
ll8. What is involved here is sometimes re-
ferred to as a "strategic evaluation" which may
be broken down into three elements:
on qssessmenl of the situatio,n, based
on intelligence, for which a number of
improvements have been proposed
above;
a politico-military analysis. w'hich is
the responsibility of the Politico-Mili-
tary Group and is founded on the more
forward-looking situation assessments
and analyses of the Military Staff. It
should lead to the definition of possible
political objectives.The Council must
choose a political objective and convey
it to the Military Staff in the form of a
strategic planning directive, known in
WEU jargon as an "initial planning di-
rective",
- 
the Military Staff can then conduct
strategic planning, in the form of a
contingency plan setting out various
strategic options according to the crite-
ria which are given priority. Given the
shortage of personnel in the Military
Staff, this phase requires active support
from a number of national staffs for in-
dependent operations, or from NATO
for operations using Alliance assets and
capabilities. It must be underlined that
to guarantee the quality of the strategic
options proposed, staff numbers in the
l9
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Operations Section of the Military
Staff must be considerably increased.
119. Once these strategic options have been
examined, amended and commented on by the
Militaqv Delegates Committee and the Politico-
Military Group, they are submitted to the
Council for a decision. That decision must spec-
ify the chain of command for the operational
planning and conduct of the operation.
120. A review of these functions shows that this
necessarily complex structure requires a process
of constant iteration between the bodies respon-
sible for the three functions: assessment of the
situation, politico-military analysis and strategic
planning. At the present time, symbiosis between
the political and military functions during this
process is assured by the presence ofrepresenta-
tives of the Military Delegates in the Politico-
Military Group. Such an approach needs to be
consolidated by formally setting up a joint polit-
ico-military coordinating body chaired at the
highest level, in other words, by the Secretary-
General, and tasked, in particular, with preparing
the strategic options to be submitted to the
Council
3. Conduct ofoperation phase
(i) Using NATO assets
Framework agreement
l2l. Problems over procedures for transferring
NATO assets for a WEU-led operation have not
yet been settled. The framework agreement, the
protot)?e for the agreement to be signed by
WEU and NATO at the onset of an operation, is
still in t}re process of being negotiated.
122. That framework agreement must safeguard
WEU's independent decision-making capability
and unity of chain of command by defining a
procedure agreed by both Organisations for
monitoring use of NATO assets and their return
or possible recall before the end of the WEU op-
eration.
123. The various decision-making procedures in
this area were considered during a joint WEU/
NATO seminar at ambassador-level in February
1999. The seminar consisted of examining a
hypothetical crisis scenario where NATO assets
and its chain of comnulnd were transferred to
WEU for preventive deployment of l0 000
troops on an imaginary island in the eastern At-
lantic.
124. As an article appearing n Defense News2
points out, there is no agreement between the
various countries as to how NATO will make
assets such as intelligence-gathering means, lo-
gistic support and airlift capability available to
WEU:
"One participant said after the serninar
that the participants were faced with at
least four competing visions of how deci-
sions ought to be carried out, with Britain,
France, Turkey and the United States each
expressing a different view.
US officials held fast to a so-called single
strategic process concept whereby NATO
must first assert its authority through de-
cisions of the North Atlantic Council.
The Council would govern each key step
of the hand-over process, from sharing in-
telligence information to planning the final
decision, grving operational control to
WEU. Turkey also argued for a strong
Alliance role, but said that WEU should
also have its own planning unit separate
from NATO's.
ln contrast, Britain and France argued for
more European autonomy, with the British
Ieaning toward a case-by-case approach.
This represents a moderate move away
from London's traditional insistence that
NATO, and NATO alone, have ultimate
control over such operations".
125. We note, therefore- on the part of non-
European allies, a desire to control the use of
assets loaned to WEU, through the requirement
that the North Atlantic Council approve the
planning by NATO military staffs, which would
considerably impinge on the autonomy of an op-
eration conducted "under the political control and
strategic direction of WEU" (Berlin Declaration
tee6).
CJTFHQs
126. The main "parent headquarters" have been
selected (AFCENT, AFSOUTH, etc.), but ac-
cording to NATO officials, a number of practical
7 *W"*.* Europe stmggles with defense identity'',
Defense News,15 February 1999.
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problems remain to be resolved before a CJTF
HQ can be swiftly and efficiently set up in a cri-
sis: designation and training of staff taking into
account the need for staff rotation, their deploy-
ment. their maintenance over long periods, com-
munications equipment etc.
127. The relevant NATO military staffs, in
particular the International Military Staff (IMS)
and the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS)
are working on all these questions in close coop-
eration with the WEU Military Staff. From the
European perspective, a sufficient number of
exercises nolv needs to be organised in order to
demonstrate the possibilrty of "separating" and
then deploying those CJTF for operations under
WEU's "political control and strategic direc-
tion".
Choice of the Operation Commander 
- 
role of
D,'SACEUR
128. A recent visit by the Assembly's Political
and Defence Committees to SHAPE (Mons)
confirmed doubts which exist as to whether
NATO really intends to let Depulv SACEUR
(D/SACEUR) be designated WEU Operation
Commander. It was clear to the members of our
Assembly that D/SACEUR considered this to be
a secondary role and that preparing to assume it
was not a priority for him. Moreover, he himself
pointed out that during an emerging crisis he
would have a part to play in SHAPE rvhich he
could probably not abandon, even for an opera-
tion conducted in the WEU framework.
129. Thus the problem of Operation Com-
mander for WEU operations needs to be solved,
since it cannot be D/SACEUR. Moreover, steps
must be taken to see to it that a "second
D/SACELJR", in other words a European general
other than D/SACEU& is designated to be in
charge of the organisation and operation of the
European military pillar ofthe Alliance.
130. It would appear that no follow-up has, as
yet, been given to the plan for setting up within
SHAPE and the CJPS a chain of European offi-
cers under D/SACELJR's command in order to
perform the tasks set out in the Berlin Declara-
tion, and that the role of D/SACELJR himself has
not yet been finalised. All this is essential for
establishing a genuinely European chain of com-
mand.
(ii) Using inclependent European assets
131. As is stated in official WEU documents,
and indeed recalled in the Saint Malo Franco-
British Declaration. Europe has two options for
managing a crisis:
autonomous WEU operations using
national or intemational headquarters
provided by WEU nations:
WEU-led operations using NATO as-
sets and capabilities.
132. Having developed the ESDI within the
Alliance since 1996, WEU must nor,v focus its
efforts on improving implementation of the
"framework nation" concept- particularly w-ith
regard to headquarters.
133. The Organisation's lveak point at the pres-
ent time is its lack of a permanent intermediate-
level headquarters, that of the Operatictn Com-
mander.It is therefore important to take stock of
all the headquarters proposed by member nations
and to assess their real capacity on the basis of a
number of criteria, to be defined, such as their
capacity for becoming combined joint structures,
their communication systems and available
space. Indeed, an audit is currently under lvay at
the instigation of the current German Presidency.
134. Some countries, in keeping with the
framework concept, have set up a core headquar-
ters on the basis of the CJTF headquarters prin-
ciple. This involves a permanent core staff of
officers which can be reinforced as necessary by
adding pre-designated elements to provide the
capacity necessary for an Operation Comman-
der's HQ. Such headquarters have been organ-
ised and tested during a number of exercises-
such as Crisex 96 and Eole 98.
135. [n fact, the solution based on core head-
quarters to which multinational elements can be
added has tu,o drawbacks: it causes delays, due
to the time needed to activate a core headquarters
which is not multinational all the time. and it may
give rise to political problems in connection with
the choice of the "framelvork nation", which may
further delay decisions. Hence it is necessary to
set up a pernanent, multinational Operation
Commander's headquarters ready to be rein-
forced as required by pre-designated national
elements made available by the various countries,
on the principle of allocating reinforcement offi-
2t
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cers :md expert modules (communications, sup-
port logistics. mobility, medical support etc.).
This core must be permanently linked lvith the
WEU Militarl' Staff and supported by the same
administrative services.
136. The problem of finding European head-
quarters which could form the core of a Force
Commander s headquarters is more easily re-
solved; because there are more headquarters
available at this level than at that of Operation
Commander. Moreover, a number of permanent
European joint headquarters already exist. WEU
nations should focus their efforts on adapting
these multinational headquarters for commanding
a combined force and on setting up a permanent
CJTF core, for example rvithin an enlarged and
combined European Corps. At the moment, un-
der normal circumstances, these HQs 
- 
ARRC,
European Corps, Eurofor etc. 
- 
are single-serv-
ice rather than combined structures.
137. [n addition, countries must be encouraged
to develop core headquarters at Force Com-
mander level. France, for example, is introducing
the concept of combined HQs lvhich can be made
multinational in the framework of the Combined
Joint Planning Staff, using once again the idea of
a permanent core which can be reinforced using
pre-designated staff from other headquarters.
Furthermore, provision has to be made for all the
equipment necessary for the HQ to be projected
into the theatre of operations, in particular the
communications and data processing equipment
required for the command of an operation.
138. As far xforces are concerned, there is no
problem, in principle, lvith the use of forces an-
swerable to WEU (FAWEU), rvhich indeed are
the same as those w'hich European countries
would make available to NATO for peacekeeping
operations, since such forces are trained and
equipped by individual nations. It is, of course,
necessary to check their abilit-v to lvork together
by means of frequent exercises, paylng particular
attention to the interoperability of their commu-
nications equipment.
139. While European capabilities in terms of
the forces required for Petersberg tasks are
judged by NATO's lnternational Military Staff
to be sufficient overall, we should not lose sight
of the well-known shortcomings of European
armed forces in the field of satellite capabilities,
strategic mobility and command and communi-
cations systems. Moreover, the air strikes against
Serbia during the Kosovo crisis have highlighted
how ill-equipped European forces are in the field
of long-range precision lveaponry, since only the
UK has some cruise missiles carried on nuclear
submarines. This makes Europe highly dependent
on the United States and only' by stepping up its
efforts in the field of defence budgets and Euro-
pean cooperation rvill it be able, in the long term,
to acquire such equipment.
140. Furthermore, prioritl, should be given to
using the multinational forces ansrverable to
WEU (FAWE[I). These forces have multina-
tional headquarters, they have, by definition,
solved the problem of interoperability behveen
their national components and are particularly
well-trained for action in a multinational frame-
work, such as Petersberg missions.
l4l. This capacity for multinational action at
short notice is extremely important and must be
continually enhanced. lndeed, the events in
Kosovo have highlighted the crucial nature of
response time in humanitarian disasters.
142. The Military Staff, under the German Pre-
sidency's prografirme, is organising an audit of
these forces, lvith a view to identifuing Europe's
capabilities in the field of the so-called Peters-
berg missions.
143. In fact, the only way to drastically shorten
response time, given the time it takes to organise
forces on an ad hoc basis, is to set up a Euro-
pean standing force answerable to WEU, w'hich
could be called the EIF (European Intervention
Force). This is not a new idea. lndeed, the As-
sembly report of I December 1997 on The WEU
Military Committeei recommended that the
Council should "establish an immediate WEU
reaction force consisting of a multinational light
infantry division supported by an air and naval
component, available at very short notice (...)".
144. lndeed, the abovementioned report showed
that Operation Alba olved its success to the rapid
reaction of a force that rvas limited in size, but
which was deployed before the crisis got out of
hand.
tn po.t *U-tted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by I[r Giannattasio, Rapporteur: Assembly Docurnent
1591.
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145. For such a force to be effective- it would
need to be composed of units made available by
individual states for a substantial period of time
and placed from the outset under the authority of
a European Chief-of-Staff, r,vho lvould execute
orders from the WEU Council in the event of a
crisis. Thus this force would have a permanent
multinational headquarters, which would solve
the problem of the absence of a permanent Euro-
pean headquarters at Force Commander level in
the theatre of operations. This multinational
headquarters would be supported by a European
General Staff which would develop out of the
present WEU Military Staff and rvhich would
exercise at European level the same organisa-
tional and operational functions as a general staff
at national level.
146. With such a European intervention force,
WEU member countries lvould have at their dis-
posal a pool of forces rvhich they could call on
immediately. The level of participation of the
different countries would have to be calculated
on the basis of objective and generallv accepted
criteria, and enable this force to be some 30 000
sfiong and have at its disposal a pre-designated
support and transport capabilit-1'. Its funding
would be shared equitably a.mong the member
countries.
147. This type of 'pre-organised" force has
often been criticised on the grounds that if one
country decides not to participate this may upset
its whole organisation at the last minute. This is
why such a force must be designed for redun-
dancy of the key elements in order to provide
functional modules (comprising infantry, signals.
headquarters support, mechanised units. auack
or support helicopters etc.) of different nationali-
ties so that it cannot be disrupted by the non-
participation of some member countries.
V Conclusions
148. During the preparation of this report we
became alvare of the efforts that WEU has made
to prepare itself for crisis-management opera-
tions. The requisite structures and procedures are
by norv well developed rvithin the Organisation.
The Military Staff was restructured a year ago
and the Military Committee has been established.
149. Relations with the other international or-
ganisations involved in this field have developed
considerably:
the procedures for NATO-WEU con-
sultation and for possible WEU re-
course to NATO assets and capabilities
have almost been finalised. Major ef-
forts have been undertaken to define a
European chain of command within
NATO, both at the level of SHAPE
and the CJTF HQs;
WEU-EU relations are being devel-
oped. The impending appointment of
the High Representative for the CFSP
and setting up of the EU Policy Plan-
ning and Early Warning Unit should
improve the procedures for consulta-
tions between the two organisations
during a crisis.
150. However, there is still room for consider-
able improvement to further enhance the per-
formance of this instrument. Indeed, Europe must
be given a genuinely autonomous chain of politi-
cal and military command for operations both
rvithin and outside the NATO framework. This
means a degree of necessary plurality to guaran-
tee Europe's autonomy, not unnecessary dupli-
cation.
l5l. We must at all costs resolve the issue of
the lack of a permanent European multinational
headquarters at Operation Commander level and
ensure that our European multinational force
headquarters can be used for combined and joint
operations at Force Commander level.
152. On the issue of forces, we must continue
training European multinational units, because
this accustoms the component national forces to
rvorking in a European framelvork. Above all,
however. we need the necessary military equip-
ment to conduct Petersberg missions autono-
mously. The corresponding financial effort must
be equitably shared among WEU member coun-
tries. Convergence criteria may be useful in this
respect.
153. Furthermore, t}re response times of the
European forces answerable to WEU must be
improved. The only solution is to set up a Euro-
pean lntervention Force, to be placed perma-
nently, both in normal times and during crises,
under the orders of a European Chief-of-Staff, in
order to provide a pool of forces available at
short notice.
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154. The WEU Council's crisis-management
instrument, while we must continue our efforts to
improve it, does function. But there must also be
political will on the part of member countries to
use it more actively. Moreover, the WEU Coun-
cil's decision-making procedures must be adap-
ted to prevent any decision to use it to from being
blocked by one or two member states.
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The operation of WEU bodies in conjunction with the EU ond NATO for crisis management
WEU
The above diagram shou's in detail the operation of WEU bodies during thc fbur phases of crisis
management and corresponds to Chapter II of the Explanatory Memorandum. The WEU decision-
making process, rvhere independent and where overlapping with NATO procedures. is denoted by grey
shading.
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